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Are The Poverty Effects of Trade Policies Invisible?  
Abstract 
Beginning with the WTO‘s Doha Development Agenda and establishment of the Millennium 
Development Goal of reducing poverty by 50 percent by 2015, poverty impacts of trade reforms 
have  become  central  to  the  global  development  agenda.  This  has  been  particularly  true  of 
agricultural trade reforms due to the importance of grains in the diets of the poor, presence of 
relatively higher protection in agriculture, as well as heavy concentration of global poverty in 
rural areas where agriculture is the main source of income. Yet some in this debate have argued 
that, given the extreme volatility in agricultural commodity markets, the additional price and 
therefore poverty impacts due to trade liberalization might well be barely discernible. This paper 
formally tests this ― invisibility hypothesis‖ using the method of stochastic simulation in a trade-
poverty modeling framework. The hypothesis test is based on the comparison of two samples of 
price and poverty distributions. The first originates solely from the inherent variability in global 
staple grains markets, while the second combines the effects of inherent market variability with 
those of trade reform in these same markets. Results, at both national and stratum levels, indicate 
that the short-run poverty impacts of full trade liberalization in staple grains trade worldwide are 
not distinguishable in the majority of cases, suggesting that the poverty impacts of more modest 
(and realistic) agricultural trade liberalization are indeed likely to be statistically invisible. This 
does not mean that such reforms are economically unimportant. Rather it is a direct consequence 
of the high degree of volatility in agricultural commodity markets. 
 
 
JEL classification: C12, C68, F17, I32, Q17, R20 
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countries, poverty headcount, volatility, stochastic simulation, non-parametric hypothesis testing.  
1  Introduction 
The  WTO‘s  Doha  Development  Agenda  and  the  Millennium  Development  Goal  to  reduce 
poverty by 50 percent by the year 2015, served to bring the poverty impacts of trade reforms into 
central  focus  for  global  policy  makers.  This  has  been  particularly  true  of  agricultural  trade 
reforms due to the importance of grains in the diets of the poor, relatively higher protection in 
agriculture, as well as the heavy concentration of global poverty in rural areas where agriculture 
is the main source of income. Three quarters of the world‘s poor reside in rural areas (World 
Development Report, 2008), mostly depending for their livelihoods on agriculture; it is therefore 
hardly surprising that changes in primary commodity prices have been identified as one of the 
most important linkages between international trade and poverty (Winters 2000). Agricultural 
commodity prices are of course inherently volatile, due to the combination of inelastic demand 
and supply, high perishability, high transport costs, and exposure to random weather shocks.The 
recent 2007/2008 food price spike,in fact, has been estimated to have thrown more than one 
hundred million people temporarily into poverty (Ivanic and Martin, 2008). 
 
Given this background volatility in agricultural prices and poverty, some have argued that the 
additional poverty impacts due to trade liberalization might well be indiscernible. Indeed, in a 
critique ofan early draft of Cline´s (2004) book on trade policy and poverty, Rodrik (2003) 
madethe point that the impacts of reforming agricultural protection in developed economies on 
world prices are likely to be dwarfed by the inherent volatility of agricultural markets. Similar 
sentiments surfaced in the context of the debate over the poverty impacts of trade liberalization 
under the Doha Development Agenda (Hertel and Winters 2006). We dub this the ‗invisibility 
hypothesis‘. The goal of this paper is to formally test this hypothesis using a model of global 
trade, linked to poverty modules for fifteen developing countries. 
 
It  is  important  to  point  out  up  front  that  failing  to  reject  (i.e.  statistically  accepting)  the  
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invisibility  hypothesis  by  no  means  implies  that  agricultural  trade  reform  is  economically 
irrelevant. It is just that even where the long run impacts of agricultural trade reform are large, 
and of lasting importance, the short run impacts of such reforms on poverty might be statistically 
invisible. This is due to the extreme volatility of international agricultural markets. As witnessed 
in recent years, commodity price swings of more than one hundred percent within a given year 
are not uncommon. These swings can themselves have a devastating effect on the poor – and 
they can also benefit those households which are net sellers of agricultural products. Given the 
significance of such commodity market volatility for the poor, we believe it is important to couch 
agricultural trade reforms in this context. Also, the fact is, that such reforms do not take place in 
a vacuum, and the presence of extreme market volatility will shape the way the world perceives 
them. It is important that those advocating agricultural trade reforms not overstate the near term 
impacts, which may indeed be dominated by other factors. On the other hand, it is also important 
to point out that, while the poverty changes induced by trade reforms may in some cases be 
smaller than those swings caused by inherent commodity market volatility, the gains from trade 
policy reforms represent permanent changes and are therefore of greater economic significance 
than the transitory changes induced by annual market volatility.  
 
Previous literature on the poverty impacts of trade reforms in the presense of inherent price 
variabilityis  limited  (Valenzuela  2009).  Bourguignon  et  al.  (2004)  developed  a  stylized 
framework to assess the impact of export price variability on household income volatility. The 
related topic of the impact of higher food prices on povertyhas also drawn attention (De Janvry 
and Sadoulet 2010, Ivanic and Martin 2008) as have the impacts of trade reforms on income 
distribution (Robbins 1996; Lunati and O´Connor 1999). However, none of these authors have 
offered a formal test of the invisibility hypothesis. The contribution of this paper is to provide 
such  a  test.  We  formulate  the  invisibility  hypothesis  as  follows:  Due  to  the  high  degree  of 
volatility inherent in agricultural commodity markets, the incremental impact of agricultural 





We focus on a subset of commodities – staple grains – which are often subject to high levels of 
protection, and which also represent a large share of the budget for the poorest households. 
Volatility in staple grains production is modeled by sampling from a distribution of productivity 
shocks  derived  from  a  time  series  analysis  of  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (FAO) 
production data. This supply-side volatility is implemented in a Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) framework – the agricultural-specific GTAP-AGR model (Keeney and Hertel, 2005). The 
general  equilibrium  approach  permits  us  to  capture  the  implications  of  changes  in  national 
commodity  and  factor  prices,  resulting  from  changes  in  global  trade  policies  as  well  as 
uncertainty  in  world  grain  yields,  while  retaining  economy-wide  consistency.  Our  analysis 
concentrates on the implications of these earnings and price changes for the utility of households 
in the neighborhood of the poverty line, asking whether they might fall below this poverty line or 
be lifted out of poverty as a result of these commodity market shocks. By aggregating across the 
diverse household groups within the economy, we arrive at a conclusion about the change in 
national poverty headcount for each draw from the agricultural productivity distribution. We 
compare the resulting distribution of poverty headcounts, with the same distribution when trade 
reforms are implemented in combination with the inherent commodity productivity volatility. 
The first set of results, stemming from the inherent variability in global staple-grains markets, is 
referred to as the stochastic baseline scenario, while the combined effects of the inherent market 
variability overlaid with trade reformsis referred to as the stochastic policy reform scenario. 
While the model is general equilibrium in nature, we only consider price volatility in the staple 
grains markets and therefore, the trade reforms are also only implemented in the staple grains 
sector.    A  further  qualification  stems  from  the  fact  that  this  is  a  static  approach.  Clearly  a 
dynamic stochastic model would be preferred. This would permit us to distinguish permanent 
from transient shocks, with important implications for agents‘ responses to these different types 





In order to get an adequately broad representation of the diverse economies and circumstances in 
which the world‘s poor live, we undertake this analysis for fifteen developing countries in South 
Asia,  Latin  America  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  remainder  of  this  study  is  organized  as 
follows. The methodology is described next (Section 2). Section 3 presents the results for the 
moments  of  distributions  for  variables  driving  poverty  headcounts  changes  before  formally 
testing the invisibility hypothesis. It also provides a discussion of sensitivity of our results to the 
assumption of exogenous trade policy changes. Caveats, conclusions and policy implications are 
discussed last (in Section 4). 
 
2  Methodology 
One  approach  to  testing  the  invisibility  hypothesis  would  be  to  develop  a  single  country 
trade/poverty  model  in  great  detail  and  test  this  hypothesis  in  the  context  of  that  particular 
country. This is attractive, as it would permit us to develop the poverty component of this study 
in considerable detail (see Hertel and Winters, 2006, for ten country case studies undertaken to 
assess the national impacts of WTO reforms). However, there are several problems with this 
approach. Firstly, using a national model makes it difficult to generate stochastic global price 
shocks in a consistent manner. Secondly, WTO agricultural reforms typically entail significant 
liberalization in developed markets, so without a global framework it is problematic to accurately 
assess the poverty impacts of such reforms on developing countries. Finally, even if we were 
able  to  generate  useful  tests  of  the  invisibility  hypothesis  for  an  individual  country,  readers 
would  very  likely  argue  that  the  results  were  specific  to  the  country  under  investigation. 
Therefore, we adopt a multi-country approach to testing the invisibility hypothesis. The cost of 
doing so is that our poverty analysis is necessarily rather simple.  
 
2.1  Poverty Headcount Analysis 
We adopt the trade/poverty approach outlined in Hertel et al (2009). Those authors focus on 
poverty headcount changes in diverse household population strata across a range of developing  
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countries. A first order approximation to such poverty headcount changes may be written as 
follows (the hats denote percentage changes in the associated variables): 
            (1). 
Here,  the  index   denotes  region  (focus  country),    the  population  stratum
1  and  the 
superscript signifies that the variable in question is associated with earnings and consumption 
patterns at the poverty level of utility. Any shock to the economy that alters the after-tax returns 
to factor   ( ) and/or the prices of consumption goods, will affect the poverty level of income 
( ), the cost of living for poor households ( ) and therefore strata poverty headcounts ( ). 
 
The term   in equation (1) is the percentage change in real factor income in 
stratum   of region  , taking into account the cost of living changes for households at the poverty 
line in stratum s of region r. The change in cost of living at the poverty line is the change in 
household expenditure required to keep utility constant at its poverty level once a new set of 
prices is obtained.   is derived by solving the household expenditure problem at the new prices, 
while keeping utility fixed at the poverty level. Thus households are permitted to alter their 
optimal consumption bundle in response to the new commodity prices. 
 
Apart from the ― driver‖ variables (after-tax factor earnings and commodity prices), two more 
elements play an important role in determining poverty headcount impacts. Coefficient  is 
the share of factor earning   in total income for households at the poverty line, in stratum s of 
region r.  For a given increase in factor earnings (e.g., unskilled agricultural labor), a stratum that 
obtains 90 percent of its income from this concerned factor, will experience a greater income rise 
than one with only 10 percent of its income attributable to that factor. Since these are shares, the 
summation over factor earnings types for any given stratum is equal to one ( ). The 
values for  in our sample of 15 countries are obtained from household surveys and range from 
0 to 0.99. They are reported in Appendix Table A1.The second coefficient of interest in equation 
                                                 
1 There are seven strata: Agriculturally self-employed, non-agriculturally self-employed, rural wage labor, 
urban wage labor, rural diversified, urban diversified and transfer stratum.  
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(1) is  , the poverty elasticity with respect to income in stratum   of region r. The higher the 
poverty  elasticity,  the  greater  the  headcount  reduction  from  a  given  increase  in  income  for 
households at the poverty line in that particular stratum. Estimates of  are typically between 




The  change  in  total  poverty  headcount  in  a  region  is  obtained  by  summing  over  stratum 
headcounts; therefore, the percentage change in national headcount can be written as a share 
weighted sum of percentage headcounts changes at the stratum level: 
                    (2), 
where the shares ( ) are the share of stratum   in total poverty in the region  .   plays an 
important  role  in  determining  how  the  stratum  headcount  changes  get  translated  into  the 
aggregate regional headcount.
3 The initial equilibrium values for all of these coefficients are 
estimated from household survey data for the 15 focus countries (Hertel et al 2004) and are 
reported in Appendix Table A2. 
 
Substituting equation (1) into (2) gives the regional headcount in terms of its driving factors 
              (3), 
Equation  (3)  can  be  further  decomposed  into  changes  due  to  pre-tax  factor  earnings 
( ), income tax changes ( ) designed to ensure revenue neutrality of policy and 
the cost of living changes due to changed consumption prices, evaluated relative to the change in 
net national income: 
      (4). 
                                                 
2More details on the elasticities can be found in Verma et al (2011). 
3 Consider for expository purposes that the poverty headcount for the rural diverse stratum for both Brazil 
and Uganda fell by 50  percent and other strata were unaffected ( , then 
regional poverty headcount in Brazil would fall by a mere 1.5 (0.03 x 50) percent while in Uganda by a 
37.5 (0.75 x 50) percent. The results are so diverse due to the big difference (0.03 versus 0.75) in the 
share of poverty population concentrated in the rural diverse stratum in the two countries, as can be seen 
from Appendix Table A2.  
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The first term in equation (4) can be termed the earnings effect and involves the changes in 
factor earnings of the poor relative to national income. The second term is the tax effect and the 
last term identifies the effect of changes in cost of living relative to net national income. The 
term   is the regional poverty elasticity and is defined as the poverty share-weighted sum of 
strata poverty elasticities ( ).  As expected, an increase in taxes or relative cost of 
living raises poverty headcount in a region while increased relative factor incomes work towards 
poverty reduction.  
 
In  this  framework,  the  poverty  headcount  in  stratum  s  of  country  r  falls  when  real  income 
increases, and the amount by which it falls depends on the density of the population in the 
neighborhood of the poverty line. This is a very handy framework for analyzing the poverty 
impacts  of  trade  and  commodity  market  volatility.  There  are,  however,  some  important 
limitations to the use of equation (1) that deserve mention. Foremost among these is the static 
composition of the strata as the earnings specialization of households isn‘t allowed to change; 
large  shocks  may  induce  a  household  to  switch  sectoral  employment  (e.g.  moving  from 
agriculture to non-agriculture), although this is less likely in the short run. In addition, we only 
focus on changes in the poverty headcount, ignoring higher order measures, such as the poverty 
gap. The virtue of this simple approach is that it can be readily implemented across a wide range 
of household strata and countries, thereby permitting us to generalize our findings. 
 
2.2  Global General Equilibrium Model 
To calculate the impact of trade policy reforms on the poverty headcount as per equation (1), we 
must first determine the impact of trade policy reforms on the poverty ― drivers‖,   and  . 
The inability of partial equilibrium frameworks to predict the changes in economy-wide factor 
returns, which play a very prominent role in the analysis, forces us to use a CGE model in our 
analysis. One of the main criticisms of CGE models is the absence of validation (Kehoe et al 
1995). Accordingly, we devote special attention to validating our model with respect to staple 




This study employs the GTAP-AGR model of Keeney and Hertel (2005) which is explicitly 
designed to focus on issues of agricultural trade liberalization. (See Appendix I for details on the 
model structure and data sources used). A short-run factor market specification is used such that 
land is commodity-specific, capital is sector-specific and labor is imperfectly mobile between 
agriculture and non-agriculture sectors. The degree of inter-sectoral mobility is determined by 
the choice of relevant parameters in the model. Here, we set these according to evidence on labor 
mobility  from  the  OECD  (2001).  In  addition,  the  model  is  modified  to  accommodate  the 
replacement of lost tax revenue from trade reforms, in the form of a non-distorting uniform ad 
valorem tax on income, making each scenario fiscally neutral.  
 
2.3  Stochastic Simulation and Model Validation 
The credibility of any simulation model hinges very much on whether the model can produce 
reliable predictions for key endogenous variables, based on historical shocks. In practice, there 
are very  few natural  experiments  involving  trade policy reforms.  WTO rounds  are typically 
concluded  once  every  decade  or  two,  and  their  implementation  is  gradual  and  fraught  with 
controversy. National reforms are sometimes more clear-cut; however, their effects are often 
confounded with other significant events (e.g., a financial crisis, or a recession, etc.). Therefore, 
we turn for validation to a different type of natural experiment which is somewhat unique to the 
staple grains markets – the focus of our analysis. In particular, we focus on how well the model 
captures the economic impacts of historic volatility in agricultural productivity – largely induced 
by weather-related shocks. Given the relative stability of demand for subsistence goods such as 
staple grains, we ignore demand-side volatility here. So we begin by characterizing supply side 
volatility  in  the  staple  grains  markets,  thereupon  asking  whether  the  model  is  capable  of 
reproducing observed price volatility in these same markets. We postulate that if the model can 
accurately characterize inter-annual price volatility in response to supply side shocks then it is 




Our validation framework involves using production shocks derived from the residuals of time 
series models of FAO grains production data. By sampling from the derived distribution, we seek 
to mimic the randomness inherent in these markets. Solving the CGE model repeatedly, each 
time  with  a  different  set  of  productivity  draws,  gives  us  the  resulting  distribution  of  price 
changes by region. The validation step then involves comparing the model results for grain price 
variation, with FAO observed price variation in each region. With the aim of improving the CGE 
replication  of  observed  FAO  price  variability,  we  adjusted  the  model‘s  consumer  demand 
elasticities for a few regions; details of the approach are given in section 2.3.1. After ensuring the 
historic price variation is faithfully  replicated, we can concentrate on the poverty headcount 
distributions associated with the stochastic baseline and stochastic policy reform scenarios and 
test for statistical difference between these two sets of results.  
 
 
2.3.1  Characterizing Volatility 
Tyers and Anderson (1992) characterize uncertainty in global food markets by sampling from a 
distribution of supply shocks. Valenzuela et al (2007) use this approach to validate a model of 
global wheat trade. We build on their approach and employ Autoregressive Moving Average 
(ARMA)  models  to  characterize  systematic  changes  in  staple  grains  production,  using  the 
ARMA  residuals  to  define  the  distributions  of  productivity  shocks.  This  specification  is 
appealing in modeling grain crops production because past values appear to carry a great deal of 
information about current values and prediction errors arise largely from weather-related shocks 
to production. We use staple grains production data from the FAO for the period 1991 to 2006 
(FAOSTAT)
4 to calculate the productivity shocks for aggregate regions.
5 The 15 focus countries 
inherit the shocks from their respective parent region. 
                                                 
4 While paddy rice and wheat are the same across GTAP and FAOSTAT terminology, the Coarse-grains 
category under GTAP covers barley, maize, mop corn, rye, oats, millet, sorghum, buckwheat, quinoa, 
fonio, triticale, canary seed, mixed grain, cereals nes., reported in FAO data. 
5Calculations using FAOSTAT data show that measures of observed volatility in output vary considerably 
depending what aggregation of crops and regions is used. Generally speaking, the higher the level of 
aggregation, the lower is the volatility that the CGE model is adjusted to replicate. The aggregation 




The model selection is guided by the significance of the AR and MA components, the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC), and autocorrelation in residuals for alternative model specifications. 
The normalized standard deviations of the production residuals from the estimated time series 
models are used to create a distribution reflecting random regional productivity variation. The 
greatest production volatility is seen in Russia
6, Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe. With 
the assumption that productivity follows a symmetric triangular distribution, the end points of 
this  distribution  are  determined  by  the  formula: 
. This estimated distribution of productivity 
shocks for each region provides the basis for implementing the stochastic baseline scenario.  
 
Our methodology involves sampling from this distribution of productivity shocks and solving the 
CGE model repeatedly. The results for each solve of the model are stored and the means and 
standard  deviations  of  the  stored  results  for  all  endogenous  variables  are  calculated.  The 
sampling is done by means of Gaussian Quadrature (GQ), a numerical integration technique 
developed as an alternative to Monte-Carlo simulations, and implemented for GTAP models by 
Pearson and Arndt (2000). The GQ technique is chosen instead of the more traditional Monte 
Carlo approach, as it significantly reduces the number of simulations while still preserving the 
accuracy of the resulting means and standard deviations for endogenous variables (DeVuyst and 
Preckel 1997). 
 
As our ability to evaluate the impacts of trade liberalization in the context of a volatile grains 
market environment critically depends on the ability of the CGE system to replicate the historical 
price  variability,  Table  1  compares  the  simulated  volatility  for  staple-grains  prices  to  FAO-
observed volatility. Since staple grains represent a composite of many commodities, we obtain a 
range of historic price volatilities from the FAO data base, as reported in the first column of this 
                                                 
6 This region includes Russia and all the constituent states of the former Soviet Union.  
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Table. For example, in Bangladesh, price volatility of rice, wheat and coarse-grains, as measured 
by  the  normalized  standard  deviation  of  ARMA  residuals,  ranges  from  5%  to  12%.  In  the 
Philippines, this is a smaller range (10% to 13%). Our initial results indicated that the model 
overstated price volatility for Philippines, Bangladesh, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Malawi and 
Mozambique; while it understated the same for Thailand. Aiming to replicate the price volatility 
for  these  regions  more  closely,  we  re-calibrated  the  consumer  demand  elasticities  in  these 
regions.
7 Demand elasticities were increased for regions were price volatility was over-predicted 
by the model, while they were reduced for Thailand. Elasticities were also increased for all the 
rest of Sub-Saharan African regions, as the model predicted unusually high price volatility for 
these countries. The price volatility results, after adjusting the elasticities, are reported in the 
second column of Table 1. This calibration process enables the CGE model to replicate the FAO 
data price variation in most cases (with the exceptions of Thailand, Colombia and Venezuela). 
For Colombia and Venezuela the model over-states price volatility. We expect that this is due to 
the Andean Price Band System policy which was implemented in 1995 and involved variable 
tariffs in Peru
8, Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador aimed at restricting price fluctuations in these 
markets  (Villoria  et  al  2002).  Our  model  does  not  undertake  modifications  to  reflect  these 
country  specific policies and therefore misses these effects.
9  For Thailand  the model  under-
predicts price volatility -- a problem similar to that faced by Valenzuela et al 2007. In their work, 
those authors found that the same type of global CGE model under-predicted price variations for 
most  exporters.  Thailand  is  a  major  exporter  of  rice.  In  our  base  case  model,  we  do  not 
incorporate the endogenous response of border policies to changes in global market condition 
such as the export bans and import policy changes which arose in the context of the 2007/2008 
food crisis. These policies tend to exacerbate price volatility – particularly for exporters (see 
                                                 
7 More details and justification for this approach is provided in Verma (2010). 
8 In case of Peru, the model generated price variation reaches the upper limit of the observed price 
variation range. 
9 In principle it would be desirable to model these policies explicitly.  However  owing  to  the  diverse 
range and complexity of policies across countries, such an endeavor is better-suited to a country case 
study approach.   
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Valenzuela  et  al  for  more  details).  We  briefly  explore  the  implications  of  such  policy 
endogeneity in section 3.3 below. 
 
With mean zero agricultural productivity shocks under the stochastic baseline, we expect mean 
zero outcomes for most model variables. The last column of Table 1 in fact shows that the mean 
changes for the poverty headcounts
10are less than 1 percent. 
 
2.3.2  Modeling Staples Trade reforms 
The first column of Table 2shows the average applied import tariffs for the year 2001 in the 
staple grains sector for all of the 15 focus countries. The year 2001 is chosen for tariffs as it is 
the base year for Doha proposals and also the base year for GTAP version 6.1 data (Dimaranan 
2006). Mexico has the highest import tariffs for staple grains, followed by Thailand and Peru. 
Overall, the focus countries have much lower tariffs on staple grains than do the non-focus 
countries (rest of world). This study considers a scenario of trade liberalization which involves 
the  complete  removal  of  tariffs  in  all  focus,  as  well  as  non-focus  countries.
11  Though  our 
simulations focus on full liberalization in all countries, under realistic trade negotiations different 
countries may undertake different levels of agricultural tariff reductions. To be consistent with 
the stochastic baseline simulations (variability is restricted to staple grain production), we do not 
consider  trade  reforms  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  Thus,  our  stochastic  policy  reform 
scenario is the combined effect of inherent market variability and the complete elimination of 
effectively applied tariffs in staple-grains market. 
                                                 
10  Any  big  numbers  in  thousands  of  units  can  be  explained  by  the  presence  of  a  big  poverty  base 
(Appendix Table A5). Note that as the percent change in poverty headcounts is the average percentage 
change in the variable across 22 simulations, the decomposition of results though along the lines of 
deterministic setup is not as straightforward. Most of the analysis therefore focuses not on what is driving 
the  means  but  on  a  more  relevant  question  that  the  stochastic  framework  can  answer:  whether  the 
distributions with and without reforms are different. 
11We focus on tariffs-only policy reform as data on domestic support and export subsidies is not available 
on a consistent global basis. Croser and Anderson (2010) using a partial equilibrium framework and a 
recent World Bank comprehensive set of indicators of distortions to agricultural incentives (Anderson and 
Valenzuela 2008) found that border measures in agricultural markets account for more than 85 percent of 
global loss of welfare.   
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3  Results 
We expect that global elimination of the import tariffs for staple grains would result in consumer 
price reductions in those countries with high initial tariffs (Table 2).Since the average import 
tariff in the focus regions is about 11 percent,  we expect the countries with higher than 11 
percent tariffs to experience greater consumer price reductions, and therefore potential greater 
poverty reductions (abstracting from the earnings side of the poverty story). We focus on the 
impacts of trade reform in the context of the stochastic simulations.
12 
 
We start by comparing pre and post reform distributions of endogenous variables that ― drive‖ the 
poverty headcount results. From equation (1) we know these to be consumption prices and factor 
earnings. Then we focus on poverty headcount distributions, at the aggregate regional as well as 
the disaggregated stratum levels.  
 
3.1  Distributions of Driver Variables 
The  comparison  of    the  mean  and  standard  deviations  of  driving  factors  –  staple  grains 
consumption prices (affecting the cost of living) and real after tax factor earnings (affecting 
income) –across the stochastic baseline and stochastic policy scenarios would provide insights 
into the results of formal test of the poverty headcount distributions under the same scenarios. If 
the moments of distributions for these variables differ little across the two scenarios, then results 
for poverty headcounts are also very likely to not be distinguishable.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for these driver variables – staple consumption prices and 
factor  incomes  respectively  –  for  all  15  countries.  For  example  the  mean  staple  grains 
consumption price in Mexico increases by 0.9 percent under stochastic baseline while it falls by 
10.9 percent under stochastic policy scenario; so there is a difference of 11.9 percentage points 
between the two scenarios for Mexico and the same figure for Thailand is 25.0 – 1.1 = 23.9 
                                                 
12 Readers interested in a detailed deterministic analysis of the impacts of tariff reform alone are referred 
to Appendix II.  
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percentage points. For Mexico, most of the change is driven by the reduction in prices as a result 
of removing high import tariffs in the country. The increase in staples price in Thailand is driven 
solely by the increased price of rice owing to increase in rice export demand (Appendix II). The 
reforms seem to benefit consumers in Latin America; as we see from Table 2 that mean staple 
prices are lower (except for Brazil
13) and no more volatile under the stochastic policy scenario as 
compared  to  the  baseline  scenario.  Also  it  is  interesting  to  see  that,  while  mean  outcomes 
(especially for staple grains) show some difference, the standard deviations across the scenarios 
are very similar, this we suspect, is owing to our model framework where policy reform and 
price variations are not explicitly linked.  
 
Table 3 offers a similar comparison of after-tax real factor earnings for the focus countries. The 
first panel in the table gives the percentage point differences in means while the bottom panel 
gives the same for standard deviations. A positive number indicates that the post liberalization 
mean or standard deviation for the factor endowment in a given country is higher than under the 
baseline (no liberalization) scenario. The changes in factor returns to land and agricultural capital 
are greater than those for other factors due to their sector specificity and more limited factor 
mobility respectively. Also, as with the results in Table 2, the changes in standard deviations are 
generally modest.  
 
Small changes in the standard deviation compared to the mean suggest that the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two sample test
14 (henceforth KS test) can be used as a formal test of difference in 
distributions of consumption prices and factor earnings. The KS test answers the question: are 
the  observations  under  one  scenario  systematically  larger  or  smaller  than  under  the  other 
scenario?  Test  results  for  staples  consumption  prices  and  factor  earnings  are  provided  in 
Appendix III. The main conclusion of the test is that, while some factors earnings are statistically 
                                                 
13 The deterministic results in Appendix II show the reason for increased post liberalization prices in 
Brazil on account of increased demand for coarse-grain exports from the country. 
14 This test in comparison to other non-parametric tests performs better for cases where there is not much 
difference in variance (Baumgartner et al 1998).  
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different post liberalization, this finding is by no means universal across factors and countries. 
Given that strata are defined, based on income specialization, it is therefore likely that we‘ll see 
within-country, across-stratum differences in the visibility of poverty headcounts. We turn now 
to the formal test of differences between poverty headcount distributions at both the country and 
stratum levels.  
 
3.2  Distribution of Poverty Headcounts 
We  implement  a  KS  test  to  formally  compare  the  two  distributions  of  poverty  headcounts, 
resulting from the stochastic baseline and stochastic policy reform scenarios. The null hypothesis 
is that the two distributions are not statistically different and are therefore hard to tell apart. 
Table 4 reports the calculated KS test statistic values, along with the associated P-values for all 
the  focus  countries.  The  table  shows  that  poverty  headcount  changes  following  trade 
liberalization  are  significantly  perceptible  at  a  10  percent  level  of  significance,  in  just  four 
countries: Indonesia, Chile, Peru and Mexico. Figure 1 shows what the results look like for two 
cases – Bangladesh and Mexico – one where the two distributions are not statistically distinct 
and  the  other  where  they  are  clearly  differentiated.  The  lines  in  the  figure  are  the  sample 
cumulative density functions (CDFs) for poverty headcount changes in the two countries under 
alternative  scenarios.  The  maximum  vertical  distance  between  the  two  lines  is  the  KS  test 
statistic. For Bangladesh, these sample CDFs lie very close together while they lie farther apart 
and do not overlap for Mexico. The samples in question here are those generated under the 
stochastic baseline and under stochastic trade liberalization. The figure brings out the nature of 
our results very clearly – the effects are visibly distinct in one case while not in the other. This 
point is further underscored via a set of diagnostic plots reported for all the sample countries in 
Appendix IV.  
 
Table 5 provides the results of the KS test of the invisibility hypothesis for all seven strata in 
each of the 15 focus countries. At the 10 percent level of significance (p-value less than 0.1), for 
only 30 of the 105 country- stratum pairs the results turn out to be statistically distinct. Note that  
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in  Indonesia  the  headcount  changes  are  statistically  visible  only  in  the  agricultural  stratum; 
however  because  this  stratum  has  a  42  percent  share  in  the  national  poverty  headcount 
(Appendix  Table  A2),  its  statistical  significance  carries  over  to  the  overall  national-level 
invisibility hypothesis test results. Conversely, while poverty headcount changes are statistically 
significant for all but the rural and urban diverse strata in Philippines, the changes at the national 
level are not significant. This stems from the fact that the two diversified strata comprise over 70 
percent of Philippines‘s poverty population (23 percent for urban diverse and 49 percent in rural 
diverse, as shown in Appendix Table A2). Two other cases that stand out in these results are 
Chile and Thailand. For Chile, while the national level impacts of trade reform are visible, only 
the agricultural stratum is statistically significant and it makes up only 26 percent (Appendix 
Table A2) of the country‘s poverty headcount. In Thailand, while all strata show significantly 
perceptible poverty headcount results, the same does not hold for the national level results due to 
the fact that the agricultural headcount reductions are offset by the urban increases. The lower 
panel  of  Table  5  sheds  further  light  on  this  conundrum.  For  Thailand  while  the  stratum 
headcounts scenarios differ significantly, the total headcount does not vary much between the 
two scenarios. The opposite is true for Chile, where poverty rises for most strata.  
 
The broad findings are that short-run poverty changes resulting from liberalizing staples sectors 
are large enough to be discernable in four of the fifteen focus countries: Peru, Mexico Chile and 
Indonesia. The P-values for the KS test (Table 4) suggest that the impacts are most likely to be 
visible in Latin America and least likely to be so in Africa and Asia. The visibility of impacts 
depends on initial level of tariffs, degree of inherent volatility and magnitude of policy shocks. 
Mexican poverty reduction benefits from reduction in a relatively high staple grains import tariff 
(Table 2), whereas most of the Sub-Saharan African countries fail to get visible impacts due to 
their highly volatile domestic markets. Also, even though the results are not statistically visible at 
the  country  level  for  some  cases,  a  look  at  a  more  disaggregated  (stratum)  level  reveals  a 
different result.  In a cross country comparison, while the national level results for Peru and 
Malawi look very different (Table 4); the change in agricultural stratum poverty in both countries  
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is  equally  visible  (Table  5).  Similarly  poverty  changes  in  rural  diverse  stratum  in  Peru  and 
Venezuela are invisible to the same degree (Table 5). 
 
3.3  What If Trade Policy Changes Are Endogenous? 
So far we have assumed in our analysis that trade policy changes are exogenous and are not 
subject to short term manipulation. However as seen in recent years, exporters and importers 
frequently resort to imposing export taxes and lowering import tariffs respectively, when world 
market  prices  rise  sharply.  Martin  and  Anderson  (2010)  argue  that  such  policy  actions 
contributed  as  much  as  a  third  to  a  quarter  of  observed  world  price  changes  in  the  recent 
commodity  price  boom.  Because  our  analysis  thus  far  has  ignored  this  possibility,  we  have 
potentially understated the benefits of eliminating trade barriers for staple grains altogether. The 
logic behind this argument is as follows. If Martin and Anderson are right and endogenously 
varying trade policies serve to amplify world price changes in the face of production shortfalls, 
then  removing  such  policies  altogether  should  have  a  stabilizing  influence  on  world  prices. 
Furthermore, by reducing price variations, trade liberalization would be more likely to result in 
statistically discernable changes in poverty. 
 
To  explore  this  possibility,  we  have  undertaken  a  robustness  check  in  which  liberalization 
scenario is compared to a new baseline scenario wherein export taxes and import tariffs respond 
endogenously to changes in commodities‘ export and import prices faced by a country. Lacking 
information on a country-specific approach to insulation, and seeking to obtain an outer bound 
on our results, we consider the case where all countries seek to insulate their domestic markets 
from world price changes, by manipulating border taxes to eliminate half of the deviation in 
border prices (relative to a global trade price index).
15 The results indicate that when all exporters 
and importers resort to such responses, world prices under the new baseline scenario increase by 
                                                 
15 This value of 0.5 is not entirely random. Anderson and Nelgen (2010) provide estimates suggesting that 
only about half the movement in international prices is transmitted to domestic markets for the period 
spanning 1985-2007.  
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a factor of about two in comparison to the case when trade shocks are treated as exogenous. The 
standard deviation of international prices as well becomes twice as large; while not much is 
achieved  on  moderating  domestic  price  movements,  due  to  the  greater  international  price 
volatility under the new baseline. Our empirical findings conform to the theoretical arguments 
presented by  Martin  and Anderson.  Turning to the invisibility hypothesis;  because  domestic 
commodity and factor prices are the driving forces behind poverty headcount results, and they 
aren‘t affected greatly, since the attempt to insulate is frustrated by greater world price volatility, 
we do not expect to see a big difference in the poverty results. We do a KS test for the regional 
headcount numbers and as expected we still get the visibility only for the previously identified 
four countries (Appendix Table A11); however the strata level results look a little different with 
5 more cases gaining significance (Appendix Table A12) in the presence of endogenous policies.  
 
4  Conclusions  
This study developed a framework to address the question about the relative size of trade policy 
induced poverty changes versus those induced by the inherent volatility in agricultural markets; 
this  is  a  different  question  and  should  not  be  confused  with  the  more  familiar  question  of 
quantifying the poverty impacts of trade reforms. As noted above, it is entirely possible that trade 
policy reform induced changes in a country‘s poverty headcounts are large, but still invisible, 
due to the high degree of commodity market volatility, as seen in the case of the Philippines. 
Conversely, modest  impacts  from  grains  liberalization  may  be visible in markets  like Chile, 
because they are characterized by relative commodity market stability. 
 
We find that, at the national level, the short-run poverty impacts of full liberalization of grains‘ 
trade are statistically distinguishable in a quarter of our sample countries. Even though policies 
do affect poverty headcounts in the remaining 11 countries, the changes are masked by the price 
changes due to the volatile nature of national grains markets. So, broadly speaking, we fail to 
reject  the hypothesis  that  the  short run impacts of trade policies are in fact  invisible in  the  
 
19 
presence of volatile commodity markets. These results however vary by stratum within countries. 
Indeed, the stratum results can be very different from the country level results.  An extreme 
example is given by the case of Thailand where, even though poverty headcounts are visible at 
the stratum level, we fail to reject the invisibility hypothesis at the  national level. Also, not 
surprisingly, the agricultural stratum impacts of agricultural trade policy reform tend to be more 
visible than the national averages in all our sample countries. The national poverty impacts are 
less visible in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in comparison to Latin America. At the stratum 
level, the poverty impacts are visible in many cases in Asia, but African impacts remain largely 
indiscernible due to the high degree of market volatility.  
 
Of course, it is not realistic to expect global trade negotiations to achieve full tariff liberalization 
as portrayed in these policy reform scenarios, and so the experiment here provides an upper 
bound on the impacts that would likely emerge from staples sector reforms. The difficulty of 
reaching agreement – even on more modest reforms, such as those proposed under the Doha 
Round of negotiations – suggests that the short-run poverty impacts of actual trade reforms will 
indeed be largely invisible to the observer of poverty headcounts in developing countries. This is 
not to say that agricultural trade reform is economically irrelevant. Indeed, it is entirely possible 
that,  even  where  the  long  run  impacts  of  agricultural  trade  reform  are  large,  and  of  lasting 
importance, the short run impacts of such reforms on poverty are statistically invisible. This is 
due to the extreme volatility of international agricultural markets. The fact is, that such reforms 
do not take place in a vacuum, and the presence of extreme market volatility will shape the way 
the world perceives them. It is important that those advocating agricultural trade reforms not 
overstate the near term impacts, which may indeed be dominated by other factors. On the other 
hand, it is also important to point out that, while the poverty changes induced by trade reforms 
may in some cases be smaller than those swings caused by inherent commodity market volatility, 
the gains from trade policy reforms represent permanent changes and are therefore of greater 
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Bangladesh  5-12  11  0.19 
Indonesia  9-19*  11  0.07 
Philippines  10-13*  13  -0.10 
Thailand  11-14  7  0.02 
Vietnam  -  7  0.18 
     
 
Brazil  11-20  12  0.09 
Chile  7-21  11  0.03 
Colombia  4-10  14  0.07 
Mexico  7-9  9  0.12 
Peru  6-15  15  0.08 
Venezuela  6-11  18  0.12 
     
 
Malawi  21-30  23  -0.01 
Mozambique  16-20  19  0.12 
Uganda  -  22  -0.07 
Zambia  -  19  0.12 
 
Source:  FAO  Price-Stat  Data  1991-2006,  Model  generated  price  variation  results  and  Authors 
Calculations using Model Simulation Results 
* FAO Price data on Wheat is not available for Indonesia and Philippines; so the range reflects the price 
volatility of rice and coarse grains only.  
- FAO Price data on none of the crops is available for Vietnam, Uganda and Zambia. 
** These changes in Poverty Headcount in absence of any policy shock arise as a result of inherent 





Table 2: Import Tariffs on Staples and Mean and Standard Deviations for Staples Prices 
(Percentage Change), Before and After Tariff Liberalization Under a Stochastic Scenario 





Deviation  Mean 
Standard-
Deviation 
Bangladesh    4.54  0.7  6.0    0.0  5.7 
Indonesia    1.47  0.9  7.7    -4.0  6.3 
Philippines    6.19  1.1  6.1    -12.1  4.7 
Thailand    20.42  1.1  4.4    25.0  5.7 
Vietnam    2.76  2.6  7.2    6.9  5.8 
 
 
   
         
Brazil    0.14  1.1  4.9    1.6  3.9 
Chile    6.98  1.0  9.4    0.7  9.2 
Colombia    12.77  0.5  3.8    -2.8  3.6 
Mexico    23.94  0.9  8.6    -10.9  7.2 
Peru    16.46  0.5  4.9    -5.1  4.4 
Venezuela    12.10  1.2  9.7    -1.1  9.4 
 
 
   
         
Malawi    0.08  4.0  20.6    3.1  19.9 
Mozambique    2.11  2.8  16.8    -1.5  16.0 
Uganda    0.72  2.4  14.5    0.8  14.1 
Zambia    2.90  2.9  17.5    2.2  17.0 
 
Poverty Regions‘ Average Tariff       11.39 
 
 
Average Tariff for other Regions        34.89 
 
 
World Average Tariff                         30.65 
 
 
Source: Calculations using GTAP Database version 6 for tariffs and using Model Simulation Results for 
others 
The average applied import tariffs are calculated as  
 














































































































































Land  -1.0  -2.5  -3.9  15.4  4.5  1.4  -1.7  -0.7  -2.1  -2.5  -0.7  -1.7  -1.4  -0.6  -1.3 
Ag-Unskilled  0.0  -0.4  0.2  1.4  0.5  0.0  -0.1  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  -0.2  0.3  0.0  0.0 
Ag-Skilled  0.0  -0.1  0.9  0.9  0.4  0.0  -0.1  0.2  0.5  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.4  0.1  0.1 
Non-Ag-Unskilled  0.2  0.7  1.9  -2.1  -0.2  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.8  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.2 
Non-Ag-Skilled  0.2  0.8  2.1  -2.2  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.8  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.2 
Wage-Unskilled  0.2  0.5  1.2  -1.5  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.8  0.3  0.1  -0.1  0.4  0.1  0.1 
Wage-Skilled  0.2  0.8  2.1  -2.2  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.8  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.2 
Ag-Capital  -1.0  -2.5  -3.9  15.4  4.5  1.4  -1.7  -0.7  -0.6  -2.6  -0.7  -1.7  -1.4  -0.6  -1.4 
Nag-Capital  0.2  0.8  2.1  -2.4  -0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.4  0.9  0.6  0.1  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.2 
Transfers  0.1  0.5  1.2  -1.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.8  0.3  0.1  -0.3  0.3  0.0  0.1 
                               
 
Standard Deviation 
Land  -0.7  -0.7  -1.2  1.8  -2.4  0.0  -0.1  0.1  -0.2  -0.8  -0.1  0.2  -0.3  -0.5  -0.3 
Ag-Unskilled  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.6  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Ag-Skilled  -0.1  0.0  -0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.5  0.0  -0.1  0.2 
Non-Ag-Unskilled  -0.1  -0.2  -0.5  0.0  -0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.4  0.0  -0.1  0.1 
Non-Ag-Skilled  -0.2  -0.2  -0.6  0.0  -0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.4  0.0  -0.1  0.1 
Wage-Unskilled  -0.1  -0.1  -0.4  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Wage-Skilled  -0.2  -0.2  -0.6  0.0  -0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.4  0.0  -0.1  0.1 
Ag-Capital  -0.7  -0.7  -1.2  1.8  -2.4  0.0  -0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.8  -0.1  0.2  -0.3  -0.5  -0.3 
Nag-Capital  -0.1  -0.2  -0.4  0.0  -0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.4  0.0  -0.1  0.0 
Transfers  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Source: Authors‘ calculations Using Model Simulation Results  
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Table 4: K-S Test Statistics, P-Values and Moments of Distributions for Poverty Headcount 
Changes  







       




Statistic     P-value  Mean 
Standard 
deviation  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Bangladesh  0.18 
 
0.84  83  598  14  553 
Indonesia  0.41 
 
0.04  10  41  25  31 
Philippines  0.27 
 
0.39  -11  277  98  262 
Thailand  0.18 
 
0.63  0  7  1  8 
Vietnam  0.14 
 
0.87  3  13  11  0 
                Brazil  0.14 
 
0.92  21  113  27  106 
Chile  0.36 
 
0.06  0  3  2  3 
Colombia  0.32 
 
0.20  3  16  -6  16 
Mexico  0.64 
 
0.00  11  104  -128  96 
Peru  0.36 
 
0.06  3  24  -9  20 
Venezuela  0.27 
 
0.39  4  24  -1  23 
                Malawi  0.32 
 
0.20  0  17  8  26 
Mozambique  0.23 
 
0.57  7  46  -6  48 
Uganda  0.27 
 
0.39  -12  14  -5  9 
Zambia  0.14     0.92  7  59  2  62 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations using Model Simulation Results 
The negative numbers under the mean columns are to be interpreted as a reduction in poverty 
headcount. 
The numbers in parenthesis correspond to a baseline with endogenous trade policy response. The 
cases where there is less than a 1000 unit change in numbers across the different baseline scenarios 



























                Bangladesh  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84 
Indonesia  0.01  0.20  0.25  0.25  0.39  0.87  0.63 
Philippines  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.39  0.84 
Thailand  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.04 
Vietnam  0.001  0.84  1  1  0.63  0.84  0.04 
                Brazil  0.25  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.92  1  1 
Chile  0.06  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.92  0.57  0.20 
Colombia  0.06  0.22  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20 
Mexico  0.00  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Peru  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.39  0.22 
Venezuela  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39 
                Malawi  0.01  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.63  0.25  0.25 
Mozambique  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57 
Uganda  0.84  0.92  0.92  0.92  1  0.57  0.84 
Zambia  0.87  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92 
 
















Diverse  Total 
THA  Reform  -5.1  1.3  2.8  0.2  4.3  -3.3  0.5  0.7 
No-reform  -0.3  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.3  -0.1  0.0  0.2 
                   
CHL  Reform  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  1.7 
No-reform  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Source: Authors‘ calculations using Model Simulation Results  
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Source: Model simulation results 
X-axis: Cumulative Density 
Y-axis: Sample Observations 
 
Sample Observations 














Table A1. Earnings Shares ( ) for Strata at $1/day 
Country  Land  AgUnskl  AgSkl  AgCap  NagUnskl  NagSkl  NagCap  WgUnskl  WgSkl  Transfe  Total 
AGRICULTURAL 
Bangladesh  0.02  0.94  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Indonesia  0.02  0.95  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Philippines  0.65  0.00  0.00  0.34  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Thailand  0.08  0.80  0.07  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  1.00 
Vietnam  0.03  0.96  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
 
Brazil  0.02  0.63  0.29  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Chile  0.23  0.44  0.00  0.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Colombia  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Mexico  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Peru  0.02  0.94  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Venezuela  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
 
Malawi  0.05  0.84  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Mozambique  0.02  0.93  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Uganda  0.29  0.17  0.00  0.52  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  1.00 
Zambia  0.28  0.02  0.00  0.69  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
NON AGRICULTURAL 
Bangladesh  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.95  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Indonesia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.94  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Philippines  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.80  0.03  0.16  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Thailand  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.91  0.06  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Vietnam  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.58  0.01  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.01  1.00 
 
Brazil  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.96  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Chile  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.88  0.09  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Colombia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.97  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Mexico  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.95  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Peru  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.82  0.11  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.01  1.00 
Venezuela  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.98  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
 
Malawi  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.71  0.03  0.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Mozambique  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.62  0.00  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Uganda  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.51  0.02  0.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Zambia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.61  0.01  0.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
                       III 
 
 
Country  Land  AgUnskl  AgSkl  AgCap  NagUnskl  NagSkl  NagCap  WgUnskl  WgSkl  Transfe  Total 
URBAN LABOR 
Bangladesh  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Indonesia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.91  0.09  0.00  1.00 
Philippines  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.93  0.06  0.00  1.00 
Thailand  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.98  0.01  0.00  1.00 
Vietnam  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.99  0.00  0.00  1.00 
 
Brazil  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.93  0.07  0.00  1.00 
Chile  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99  0.01  0.00  1.00 
Colombia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99  0.01  0.00  1.00 
Mexico  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.96  0.03  0.00  1.00 
Peru  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.92  0.07  0.01  1.00 
Venezuela  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.97  0.03  0.00  1.00 
 
Malawi  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.83  0.16  0.00  1.00 
Mozambique  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Uganda  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.32  0.67  0.01  1.00 
Zambia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.66  0.34  0.00  1.00 
RURAL LABOR 
Bangladesh  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.92  0.07  0.00  1.00 
Indonesia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.94  0.06  0.00  1.00 
Philippines  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.95  0.04  0.00  1.00 
Thailand  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.98  0.01  0.01  1.00 
Vietnam  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.79  0.18  0.01  1.00 
 
Brazil  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.96  0.04  0.00  1.00 
Chile  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.98  0.02  0.00  1.00 
Colombia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99  0.01  0.00  1.00 
Mexico  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Peru  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.92  0.07  0.01  1.00 
Venezuela  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.96  0.04  0.00  1.00 
 
Malawi  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.89  0.10  0.00  1.00 
Mozambique  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Uganda  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Zambia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.79  0.21  0.00  1.00 
 
 




Country  Land  AgUnskl  AgSkl  AgCap  NagUnskl  NagSkl  NagCap  WgUnskl  WgSkl  Transfe  Total 
TRANSFERS 
Bangladesh  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.98  1.00 
Indonesia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Philippines  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99  1.00 
Thailand  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.99  1.00 
Vietnam  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
 
Brazil  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Chile  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Colombia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Mexico  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Peru  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Venezuela  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
 
Malawi  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Mozambique  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Uganda  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.99  1.00 
Zambia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
URBAN DIVERSE 
Bangladesh  0.02  0.20  0.00  0.02  0.19  0.00  0.01  0.43  0.05  0.09  1.00 
Indonesia  0.05  0.30  0.00  0.03  0.19  0.01  0.09  0.28  0.00  0.05  1.00 
Philippines  0.20  0.00  0.02  0.11  0.15  0.00  0.07  0.33  0.01  0.12  1.00 
Thailand  0.02  0.24  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.28  0.05  0.30  1.00 
Vietnam  0.04  0.43  0.00  0.02  0.11  0.00  0.24  0.02  0.00  0.14  1.00 
 
Brazil  0.00  0.09  0.05  0.02  0.11  0.01  0.00  0.32  0.02  0.38  1.00 
Chile  0.07  0.16  0.00  0.10  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.38  0.00  0.26  1.00 
Colombia  0.00  0.19  0.00  0.00  0.32  0.00  0.03  0.29  0.00  0.17  1.00 
Mexico  0.01  0.11  0.00  0.01  0.08  0.00  0.01  0.48  0.01  0.29  1.00 
Peru  0.01  0.23  0.00  0.01  0.28  0.05  0.04  0.20  0.01  0.17  1.00 
Venezuela  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.01  0.34  0.01  0.00  0.27  0.02  0.28  1.00 
 
Malawi  0.04  0.28  0.00  0.07  0.04  0.00  0.14  0.19  0.00  0.24  1.00 
Mozambique  0.01  0.35  0.00  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.19  0.12  0.00  0.27  1.00 
Uganda  0.15  0.13  0.00  0.28  0.06  0.00  0.09  0.14  0.05  0.10  1.00 
Zambia  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.03  0.19  0.00  0.15  0.38  0.07  0.10  1.00 
 




Country  Land  AgUnskl  AgSkl  AgCap  NagUnskl  NagSkl  NagCap  WgUnskl  WgSkl  Transfe  Total 
RURAL DIVERSE 
Bangladesh  0.01  0.18  0.00  0.01  0.20  0.00  0.03  0.43  0.04  0.10  1.00 
Indonesia  0.06  0.32  0.00  0.04  0.20  0.00  0.08  0.26  0.00  0.04  1.00 
Philippines  0.22  0.00  0.02  0.12  0.14  0.01  0.08  0.30  0.01  0.11  1.00 
Thailand  0.04  0.21  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.24  0.07  0.35  1.00 
Vietnam  0.01  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.21  1.00 
 
Brazil  0.00  0.10  0.04  0.01  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.32  0.01  0.41  1.00 
Chile  0.05  0.16  0.00  0.07  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.35  0.00  0.35  1.00 
Colombia  0.00  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.30  0.00  0.02  0.22  0.02  0.21  1.00 
Mexico  0.01  0.14  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.00  0.01  0.48  0.00  0.30  1.00 
Peru  0.02  0.20  0.00  0.03  0.30  0.07  0.11  0.12  0.00  0.14  1.00 
Venezuela  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.32  0.01  0.00  0.28  0.04  0.25  1.00 
 
Malawi  0.03  0.38  0.00  0.06  0.07  0.00  0.11  0.08  0.00  0.27  1.00 
Mozambique  0.01  0.43  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.00  0.20  0.07  0.00  0.20  1.00 
Uganda  0.14  0.15  0.00  0.26  0.06  0.00  0.14  0.08  0.06  0.10  1.00 
Zambia  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.20  0.00  0.13  0.43  0.04  0.12  1.00 














                                                 
16Hertel, T.W., R. Keeney, M. Ivanic and LA Winters, 2009. ― Why Isn't the Doha Development Agenda more Poverty Friendly?‖ Review of Development 




Table A2: Income Elasticity of Poverty Headcount and Stratum Shares in Regional Poverty Headcount (at $1/day) 
  Strata  
Country  Agric.  Non-Agric.  Urban 
Labor  Rural Labor  Transfer  Urban Diverse  Rural Diverse  Total 
Income Elasticity of Poverty Headcount 
Bangladesh   1.64  2.02  1.58  0.63  0.56  1.74  1.09  1.24 
Indonesia   2.35  2.14  2.38  2.89  1.17  2.58  2.87  2.47 
Philippines   2.25  1.96  2.98  2.44  1.69  2.42  1.98  2.15 
Thailand   2.30  2.42  2.98  2.45  2.78  2.42  2.59  2.57 
Vietnam   0.48  1.12  2.81  8.98  0.84  0.86  1.01  0.98 
Brazil   0.75  1.28  1.94  2.19  0.34  3.63  2.69  1.35 
Chile   1.90  2.24  2.06  1.55  2.45  2.29  2.60  2.18 
Colombia   0.79  0.60  1.73  1.72  0.93  1.14  1.00  0.82 
Mexico   1.73  1.90  3.33  2.08  2.28  1.63  1.80  2.02 
Peru   1.50  1.32  2.37  1.73  0.44  1.09  1.05  1.07 
Venezuela   0.69  1.16  2.57  2.17  0.01  1.72  1.53  1.20 
Malawi   0.49  0.30  2.26  1.97  0.43  1.04  0.76  0.58 
Mozambique   0.28  0.94  0.97  0.76  0.48  1.58  0.99  0.64 
Uganda   0.28  0.40  1.71  0.34  0.01  0.36  0.21  0.24 
Zambia   0.00  0.64  2.28  0.91  0.45  1.29  0.37  0.61 
Stratum Share in Poverty Population  
Bangladesh   0.15  0.13  0.04  0.22  0.03  0.07  0.37  1.00 
Indonesia   0.42  0.12  0.02  0.07  0.04  0.06  0.28  1.00 
Philippines   0.12  0.06  0.03  0.05  0.03  0.23  0.49  1.00 
Thailand   0.06  0.02  0.00  0.06  0.11  0.07  0.68  1.00 
Vietnam   0.04  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.10  0.70  1.00 
Brazil   0.14  0.09  0.24  0.15  0.32  0.04  0.03  1.00 
Chile   0.26  0.01  0.09  0.09  0.28  0.15  0.12  1.00 
Colombia   0.28  0.43  0.03  0.04  0.12  0.05  0.04  1.00 
Mexico   0.05  0.06  0.05  0.12  0.28  0.14  0.29  1.00 
Peru   0.07  0.35  0.01  0.02  0.22  0.11  0.23  1.00 
Venezuela   0.08  0.24  0.17  0.10  0.28  0.08  0.05  1.00 
Malawi   0.54  0.11  0.00  0.03  0.07  0.01  0.25  1.00 
Mozambique   0.41  0.13  0.01  0.05  0.14  0.06  0.19  1.00 
Uganda   0.10  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.07  0.75  1.00 
Zambia   0.34  0.23  0.10  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.11  1.00 




Model Structure and Data Sources 
 
Modeling structure and data used in this study is outlined in figure below.  
 
Source: Adapted from Ivanic (2004)
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The model uses factor earnings information from household surveys (processed and reconciled 
with the GTAP data by Ivanic 2004) and World Bank‘s country poverty headcount estimates 
along  with  the  GTAP  database  version  6.1  (Dimaranan  2006
18)  as  inputs  into  the  CGE 
framework.  The  parameters  of  consumption  demand  equations  (An  Implicit  Direct  Additive 
                                                 
17Ivanic, M. 2004.Reconciliation of the GTAP and household survey data. Technical report, Global Trade Analysis 
Project. 
18Dimaranan, B. V. (editor). 2006. Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 6 Data Base. Center for 




Demand  System;  Cranfield  2004
19)  are  estimated  using  Deininger  and  Squire  Income 
distribution data (1996)
20  and GTAP version 6.1. Unlike some earlier studies we model the 
poverty consumption response to shocks within the CGE framework. This integration ensures 
consistency of results. Equations determining poverty headcount changes to operate within the 
CGE model. 
Uncertainty  in  grain  supplies  is  implemented  in  the  model  through  a  series  of  stochastic 
productivity shocks, inferred from FAO production data using Autoregressive Moving Average 
models. These simulations also yield distributions of consumer and factor price changes. The 
ability of model to  reproduce the historic volatility in  prices  is  assessed, which we  call the 
validation exercise. Essentially we compare the price volatility that the model generates in the 
attempt to replicate production volatility. Again use has been made of FAO price data for the 
years 1991-2006. 
Trade policy reforms in grains, modeled in combination with the same stochastic productivity 
shocks produce a second set of distributions of consumer and factor price changes and thereby 
distributions of consumption, utility and poverty headcount. The assessment of the significance 
of difference of the two sets of distributions of poverty headcount is based on a non-parametric 
test.  If  the  critical  value  exceeds  the  absolute  test  statistic  value  we  fail  to  reject  the  null 
hypothesis that there is no significant statistical difference in of two distributions and therefore 
conclude that impacts of reforms are not statistically significantly perceptible. 
The level of aggregation in the model is defined at 34 regions and 23 sectors. Sector aggregation 
is provided in Table A3. Regional aggregation describes major trading blocs, and singles out 15 
developing countries for which detailed household survey information is available (Table A4).  
Table A5 lists the 15 focus countries and their economic indicators.  
 
 
                                                 
19Cranfield, J.A.L., P.V. Preckel, J.S. Eales, and T.W. Hertel.2004. ― Simultaneous estimation of an implicit directly 
additive demand system and the distribution of expenditure — an application of maximum entropy.‖ Economic 
Modelling, 21(2), 361-385. 
20Deininger, K., and L. Squire. 1996. A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality World Bank Economic Review 




Table A3: Sector Aggregation 





1  Paddy rice  Rice  grain 
2  Wheat  Wheat  grain 
3  Cereal grains nec  Crsgrns  grain 
4  Vegetables, fruit, nuts  OthCrps  fruits 
5  Oil seeds  Oilseeds  grain 
6  Sugar cane, sugar beet  Sugar  sugar 
7  Plant-based fibers  Cotton  mfg 
8  Crops nec  OthCrps  fruits 
9  Cattle,sheep,goats,horses  Cattle  meat 
10  Animal products nec  NRumin  meat 
11  Raw milk  Milk  dairy 
12  Wool, silk-worm cocoons  TextAppl  mfg 
13  Forestry  Res  mfg 
14  Fishing  Fish  meat 
15  Coal  Utility  svcs 
16  Oil  Res  mfg 
17  Gas  Utility  svcs 
18  Minerals nec  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
19  Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse  PrBeef  meat 
20  Meat products nec  PrNRumn  meat 
21  Vegetable oils and fats  PrOilsd  oil 
22  Dairy products  PrDairy  dairy 
23  Processed rice  PrRice  grain 
24  Sugar  PrSugar  sugar 
25  Food products nec  OthFdBev  othrproc 
26  Beverages and tobacco products  OthFdBev  othrproc 
27  Textiles  TextAppl  mfg 
28  Wearing apparel  TextAppl  mfg 
29  Leather products  TextAppl  mfg 
30  Wood products  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
31  Paper products, publishing  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
32  Petroleum, coal products  Res  mfg 
33  Chemical,rubber,plastic prods  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
34  Mineral products nec  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
35  Ferrous metals  HvyMnfcs  mfg X 
 
 
36  Metals nec  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
37  Metal products  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
38  Motor vehicles and parts  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
39  Transport equipment nec  Srvcs  svcs 
40  Electronic equipment  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
41  Machinery and equipment nec  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
42  Manufactures nec  HvyMnfcs  mfg 
43  Electricity  Utility  svcs 
44  Gas manufacture, distribution  Utility  svcs 
45  Water  Utility  svcs 
46  Construction  Srvcs  svcs 
47  Trade  Srvcs  svcs 
48  Transport nec  Srvcs  svcs 
49  Sea transport  Srvcs  svcs 
50  Air transport  Srvcs  svcs 
51  Communication  Srvcs  svcs 
52  Financial services nec  Srvcs  svcs 
53  Insurance  Srvcs  svcs 
54  Business services nec  Srvcs  svcs 
55  Recreation and other services  Srvcs  svcs 
56  PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat  Srvcs  svcs 




Table A4. Regional Aggregation 
Regions  Original 92GTAP regions 
Oceania  Australia; New Zealand, Rest of Oceania 
 
High Income East Asia  Singapore; Japan; Korea; Taiwan. 
 
China  China. 
 
South Asia 
Bangladesh; Indonesia; India; Pakistan; Philippines; Thailand; Vietnam; 
Rest of South East Asia; Rest of South Asia 
 
USA Canada  Canada; United States. 
 
Latin America 
Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Mexico; Peru; Venezuela; Rest of South America; 
Rest of Central America and Caribbean. 
 
Eastern Europe 
Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; United Kingdom; 




Switzerland; Rest of EFTA; Albania; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech 
Republic; Hungary; Malta; Poland; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Estonia; 
Latvia; Lithuania; Turkey. 
 
Russia  Russian Federation; Rest of Former Soviet Union. 
 
Middle East North Africa  Rest of Middle East; Morocco; Tunisia; Rest of North Africa. 
 
Sub Saharan Africa 
Mozambique; Malawi; Tanzania; Uganda; South Africa; Zimbabwe; Rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
   
 
Regions/countries for which there is available household survey data to conduct poverty analysis 
Asia                              Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam  
Latin America              Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela 




Table A5: Economic Indicators for Focus Regions of Poverty Analysis 






GDP per capita 




value added as 




Bangladesh  140.9  44.84  1,613  24.1  1996 
Indonesia  214.3  15.12  3,020  17.0  1993 
Philippines  77.1  11.38  3,919  14.9  1999 
Thailand  61.6  1.2  6,452  9.1  1996 
Vietnam  79.2  1.53  2,103  23.2  1998 
           
Brazil  174.0  23.01  7,571  6.1  1998 
Chile  15.4  0.29  9,354  8.8  1998 
Colombia  42.8  4.01  6,050  14.0  1998 
Mexico  100.5  9.45  8,738  4.2  2000 
Peru  26.0  4.4  4,699  8.5  1999 
Venezuela  24.6  3.26  5,763  5.0  1998 
           
Malawi  11.6  4.24  582  36.2  1998 
Mozambique  18.2  6.13  *1,050  26.7  2003 
Uganda  24.2  17.25  1,291  36.6  1999 
Zambia  10.6  6.02  790  22.1  1998 













Results of Trade Reforms in Deterministic Framework 
 
 
With slight modifications, equation (4) can be rewritten in terms of change in poverty headcount 
in thousands of units rather than percent changes:  
   
where    .  The  term  ( )  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  initial 
poverty headcount in the country, which along with the poverty elasticities are applied to the 
percentage changes in endogenous variables. For any given level of elasticity and changes in 
factor earnings, taxes and cost of living, the higher the poverty base the higher would be the 
magnitude of headcount changes.  
 
Tables A6 and A7 show the effect of staples trade liberalization on each of the three components 
alluded to in equation (4) and the decomposition of changes in poverty headcount. Looking at the 
results, we do not expect to get the clear sign consistency of results that Hertel et al 2009 find in 
their study which employs the same deterministic framework. We instead get a mixed set here, 
however our results are not strictly comparable to theirs; the reason being twofold. Unlike them 
our  focus  on  volatility  restricts  the  reforms  to  staple  grains,  while  they  undertake  the 
liberalization  for  all  of  agriculture.  Also  we  consider  the  effects  of  liberalization  by  all  the 
regions  together.  The  effects  of  poor  and  non-poor  country  reforms  in  isolation  (focused  in 
Hertel  et  al  2009)  work  in  the  opposite  directions.  Effect  of  OECD  country  reforms  works 
towards increasing the world prices and therefore benefitting the factors employed in agriculture 
in the poor countries but at the same time increased consumption prices work towards increasing 
the cost of living in the poor countries. On the other hand a reduction in import tariffs in poor 
countries reduces the cost of living but also the import tariff revenue. The results in the Tables 
A6 and A7 depend on which effects dominate. The last two columns in the Table A8 give the 
change in power of tax and the change in relative cost of living.  XIV 
 
 
Relative cost of living (Table A7 column 3) and poverty headcount attributable to it (Table A6 
column  4)  falls  for  all  but  Thailand,  Brazil  and  Malawi;  this  can  be  traced  to  increased 
consumption prices for staple grains in Thailand (24 percent) and Brazil (1.1 percent) while for 
Malawi even though the staple consumption prices fall (-0.5 percent), the greater proportionate 
fall in income (-0.59 percent) that drives the result (Table A7). The increase in staples price in 
Thailand are driven solely due increased price of rice owing to increase in rice export demand. 
For Brazil the increased consumption prices reflect the increased exports demand for rice and 
coarse-grains.  
 
In terms of factor earnings (Table A8), the non-agricultural and economy wide wages (both 
skilled and unskilled) rise in all countries except Vietnam, Thailand and Brazil, therefore raising 
expectations that the non-agriculture and urban strata (which derive a greater proportion of their 
incomes from the factors mentioned) would show a reduction in poverty headcounts. Table A9 
provides for all strata region pairs, the results equivalent to Table A6; and as expected the row 
titled earnings for strata non-agriculture and urban labor does indeed show a reduction in poverty 
headcount across all countries but the three aforementioned.  
 
In terms of numbers at the country level (Table A6 column 2) the biggest reduction due to factor 
earning effects is seen in Thailand (41000) while the biggest unfavorable outcome is observed 
for Philippines with poverty headcount increasing by 384000. Table A8 supports and explains 
these results. In case of Philippines returns to agricultural factors fall as do unskilled wages; this 
combined  with  the  fact  that  over  70  percent  (Table  A2)  of  population  in  the  country  is 
concentrated in urban and rural diverse strata which derive over 65 percent of income from 
returns  to  agricultural  and  unskilled  wages,  explains  why  earnings‘  contribution  to  poverty 
headcount is big and positive. For Thailand, the results from Table A8 by themselves are less 
convincing. Note that about 68 percent of Thai poverty population is accounted by the rural 
diverse  strata  (Table  A2)  deriving  its  income  from  agricultural  unskilled,  wage  unskilled 
earnings (Table A1). With both sources commanding equal shares (about 22 each), the gains in XV 
 
 
agricultural  unskilled  (2.78  percent)  outweigh  the  loss  in  wage  unskilled  earnings  (-0.24 
percent). 
 
Another small result that stands out here is that the magnitude of change in factor earnings is 
always much larger for land and agricultural capital, it is so because these two factors are fixed 
and cannot move across alternative uses. 
 
It is important to note that the poverty headcount results at both regional and strata level, depend 
not only on how big are factor earning changes but also the poverty elasticities and the share of 
strata in total regional poverty. Table A2 in appendix provides these numbers. This can explain 
for example why in Bangladesh despite a modest increase in non-agricultural earnings and wages 
(Table A8) in comparison to some other countries (eg. Malawi), the non-agriculture and rural 
labor strata witness higher poverty reduction (Table A9). As can be seen from the Table A2 that 
Bangladesh‘s  poverty  elasticity  of  non-agricultural  (2.02)  and  poverty  share  of  rural  diverse 
labor (37 percent) are quite high. And even though the poverty elasticities in Malawi for rural 















Table A6: Decomposition of Change in Regional Poverty Headcount (‗000) 
 
Earnings  Tax  COL  Total 
Bangladesh  -38  14  -42  -67 
Indonesia  176  8  -169  15 
Philippines  384  -4  -287  93 
Thailand  -41  4  34  -2 
Vietnam  3  0  -2  1 
          Brazil  10  2  -1  11 
Chile  2  0  0  2 
Colombia  -2  2  -9  -9 
Mexico  1  5  -145  -139 
Peru  -2  5  -16  -12 
Venezuela  -2  1  -4  -4 
          Malawi  0  -1  6  5 
Mozambique  -1  1  -12  -13 
Uganda  6  1  -1  6 
Zambia  -3  0  -3  -6 
Source: Model Simulation Results 
 










Income         
Bangladesh  -0.5  -0.08  -0.24  -0.16         
Indonesia  -4.5  -0.45  -0.79  -0.34         
Philippines  -12.7  -1.17  -2.80  -1.63         
Thailand  24.0  1.10  2.23  1.13         
Vietnam  6.0  -0.15  0.51  0.65         
         
       
Brazil  1.1  0.00  0.06  0.07         
Chile  -0.4  -0.04  -0.23  -0.18         
Colombia  -3.3  -0.27  -0.45  -0.18         
Mexico  -11.7  -0.76  -0.85  -0.09         
Peru  -5.5  -0.33  -0.69  -0.36         
Venezuela  -2.2  -0.10  -0.14  -0.04         
         
       
Malawi  -0.5  0.25  -0.33  -0.59         
Mozambique  -4.0  -0.31  -0.52  -0.21         
Uganda  -1.4  -0.03  -0.60  -0.57         
Zambia  -0.5  -0.08  -0.24  -0.16         
Source: Model Simulation Results XVII 
 
 


































































































Bangladesh  -0.92  -0.01  0.00  -0.91  0.15  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.14  0  0.03  -0.08 
Indonesia  -2.72  -0.78  -0.56  -2.73  0.23  0.33  0.32  0.03  0.33  0  0.02  -0.45 
Philippines  -4.76  -0.99  -0.35  -4.76  0.57  0.80  0.81  -0.06  0.78  0  -0.02  -1.17 
Thailand  17.08  2.78  2.25  17.07  -0.88  -0.92  -1.15  -0.24  -0.92  0  0.22  1.10 
Vietnam  6.38  0.44  0.38  6.38  -0.55  -0.48  -0.49  -0.40  -0.48  0  0.03  -0.15 
 
           
     
     
      Brazil  1.56  -0.04  -0.03  1.55  -0.06  -0.04  -0.07  -0.06  -0.04  0  0.01  0.00 
Chile  -1.72  -0.08  -0.08  -1.72  0.09  0.08  0.10  0.07  0.08  0  0.02  -0.04 
Colombia  -0.85  -0.02  -0.02  -0.85  0.13  0.11  0.18  0.11  0.11  0  0.07  -0.27 
Mexico  -2.75  -0.28  -0.25  -1.23  0.10  0.10  0.14  0.07  0.10  0  0.05  -0.76 
Peru  -2.47  -0.23  -0.18  -2.50  0.18  0.15  0.39  0.09  0.15  0  0.13  -0.33 
Venezuela  -0.76  -0.03  -0.03  -0.76  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.05  0  0.03  -0.10 
 
           
     
     
      Malawi  -1.54  0.17  0.21  -1.53  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.24  0.28  0  -0.06  0.25 
Mozambique  -1.50  -0.01  0.06  -1.50  0.19  0.21  0.20  0.13  0.21  0  0.02  -0.31 
Uganda  -0.57  0.05  0.17  -0.57  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.10  0.23  0  0.04  -0.03 
Zambia  -1.25  -0.02  0.02  -1.33  0.13  0.14  0.17  0.09  0.14  0  0.01  -0.08 
Source: Authors‘ calculations using Model Simulation Results XVIII 
 
 

































































































































                              Earnings  6  126  138  -8  0  -2  1  0  2  2  0  1  1  2  0 
Tax  3  3  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  -1  0  0  0 
COL  -8  -67  -34  2  0  0  0  -2  -7  -1  0  3  -2  0  0 
Total  0  63  103  -5  0  -2  1  -2  -4  1  0  3  -1  2  0 
Non-Agric 
                              Earnings  -17  -9  -8  0  1  2  0  -1  -1  -4  -1  0  -1  -1  -1 
Tax  3  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  3  0  0  0  0  0 
COL  -9  -18  -15  1  0  0  0  -3  -9  -7  -1  0  -2  0  -1 
Total  -22  -26  -23  1  1  2  0  -3  -9  -8  -1  0  -4  -1  -2 
Urban Lab 
                              Earnings  -3  0  0  0  0  6  0  0  -1  0  -1  0  0  0  -1 
Tax  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
COL  -2  -3  -10  0  0  0  0  -1  -12  0  -1  0  0  0  -1 
Total  -5  -3  -10  0  0  7  0  -1  -12  0  -2  0  0  0  -2 
Rural Lab 
                              Earnings  -7  -1  1  0  0  4  0  0  -2  0  0  -1  0  0  0 
Tax  2  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
COL  -5  -14  -16  2  0  0  0  -1  -18  0  -1  1  -1  0  0 
Total  -10  -14  -16  3  0  5  0  -1  -19  0  -1  0  -1  0  -1 
Transf 
                              Earnings  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Tax  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
COL  -1  -3  -6  4  0  0  0  -1  -45  -1  0  0  -1  0  0 
Total  -1  -3  -6  4  0  0  0  -1  -45  -1  0  0  -1  0  0 
Urban Div 
                              Earnings  -3  9  87  -2  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Tax  1  1  -1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
COL  -4  -11  -76  2  0  0  0  -1  -17  -2  0  0  -2  0  -1 
Total  -6  -2  11  0  -1  0  0  -1  -15  -1  0  0  -2  1  -1 
Rural Div 
                              Earnings  -14  51  165  -32  2  0  0  0  2  1  0  0  0  4  0 
Tax  4  3  -2  3  0  0  0  0  2  1  0  0  0  1  0 
COL  -14  -54  -130  23  -2  0  0  0  -37  -4  0  2  -4  -1  0 
Total  -23  -1  34  -5  1  0  0  0  -34  -2  0  2  -4  4  0 




The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test and Results for Staple Prices 
 
We use this test to check if the distributions of staple prices for each country in our sample can 
statistically be originating from the same underlying distribution. Note that though the extreme 
values for productivity shocks are calculated under the assumption of a symmetric triangular 
distribution it does not imply that the shocks yield the same distribution or distribution shape for 
the endogenous variables that it generates as solutions. It is the absence of information about 
distribution of the endogenous variables that makes us rely on non-parametric test.  
 
The  KS  test  used  here  is  the  general  two  sample  non-parametric  test  which  tests  the  null 
hypothesis  that  the  two  samples  are  drawn  from  the  same  distribution  (irrespective  of  what 
exactly that distribution might be). The basic idea behind the test is to compare the cumulative 
distribution functions of the two samples and evaluate how close together the two lie.  
 
Briefly let there be two variables   and   with samples   and  ,of size   
and  . Let their CDFs be denoted   and  . The null hypothesis is testing against a 
general alternative where 
 
In absence of knowledge about the true distribution we usean empirical (sample counterpart) 
distribution functions  and  shown to be a consistent point estimators of the respective 
true CDFs. The test statistic , if greater than critical value  , we 
can reject the null at   level of significance; else we fail to reject that the two distributions are 
statistically different. More details on the test can be found in Gibbons and Chakraborti 2003.
21 
 
To empirically implement this test, we gather the solution for staples prices from each of the 22 
simulations and have two such samples of 22 observations each (  =   = 22) corresponding to 
pre  and  post  trade  reform.  The  corresponding  hypotheses  stated  in  economic  terms  are  – 
                                                 




   
 
Table A10: KS P-Values For Rejecting the Null (No Difference in Driver Variables‘ Distributions Across Scenarios) 
 
Staples Price  Land  AgUnskl  AgSkl  AgCap  NagUnskl  NagSkl  NagCap  WgUnskl  WgSkl  Transfe 
Bangladesh  0.92  0.84  0.57  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84 
Indonesia  0.20  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.06  0.20  0.06  0.20  0.39  0.06  0.39 
Philippines  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01 
Thailand  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Vietnam  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.06  0.01  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.63 
                        Brazil  0.57  0.04  0.57  0.63  0.04  0.63  0.84  0.25  0.63  0.84  0.87 
Chile  0.92  0.39  0.92  0.92  0.39  0.84  0.84  0.92  0.84  0.84  0.92 
Colombia  0.01  0.20  0.06  0.11  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20 
Mexico  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.01  0.57  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Peru  0.00  0.02  0.06  0.39  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.02 
Venezuela  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.57  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39 
                        Malawi  0.92  0.84  0.57  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.92  0.84  0.84  0.84 
Mozambique  0.84  0.63  0.57  0.57  0.63  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57 
Uganda  0.92  0.87  1  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.92  1  0.87  1 
Zambia  1  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.87  0.87  0.92  0.87  0.87  0.92 
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Quantile-Quantile Plot
i A QQ diagnostic plot is given in this Appendix for each of the countries. This is a 
non-parametric method of comparing distributions, by plotting quantiles of one distribution against that of the other. On the y-axis we have the distribution 
corresponding to stochastic baseline and on x-axis is the trade liberalization under stochastic setup. The closer the scatter points lie to the 45 degree line the more 
similar are the distributions and therefore more difficult it is to reject the null.XXV 
 
 
Table  A11:  K-S  Test  Statistics,  P-Values  and  Moments  of  Distributions  for  Poverty 
Headcount Changes when Policy Changes are Endogenous 










value  Mean 
Standard 
deviation  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
      (in thousands) 
Bangladesh  0.18  0.84  84  592  14  553 
      (83)  (598)     
Indonesia  0.41  0.04  10  44  25  31 
        (41)     
Philippines  0.27  0.39  -10  268  98  262 
      (-11)  (277)     
Thailand  0.18  0.84  0  7  1  8 
    (0.63)         
Vietnam  0.14  0.87  2  13  11  0 
      (3)       
              Brazil  0.32  0.20  18  102  27  106 
  (0.14)  (0.92)  (21)  (113)     
Chile  0.36  0.10  0  3  2  3 
    (0.06)         
Colombia  0.27  0.25  3  16  -6  16 
  (0.32)  (0.20)         
Mexico  0.64  0.00  12  97  -128  96 
      (11)  (104)     
Peru  0.36  0.06  4  25  -9  20 
      (3)  (24)     
Venezuela  0.27  0.57  4  22  -1  23 
    (0.39)    (24)     
              Malawi  0.32  0.20  0  17  8  26 
Mozambique  0.23  0.57  7  44  -6  48 
        (46)     
Uganda  0.31  0.20  -8  9  -5  9 
  (0.27)  (0.39)  (-12)  (14)     
Zambia  0.14  0.92  7  56  2  62 
        (59)     
Source: Authors‘ calculations using Model Simulation Results  
The negative numbers under the mean columns are to be interpreted as a reduction in poverty headcount.  
Numbers in parenthesis pertain to the original baseline scenario (with exogenous tariff changes) and provided 
for comparison purposes. XXVI 
 
 
Table A12: P-Values for KS test of ― Invisibility Hypothesis‖ at Stratum Level when Policy 




Agric  RuralLab  UrbanLab  Transf  RuralDiv  UrbanDiv 
                Bangladesh  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84 
          (0.87)     
Indonesia  0.01  0.20  0.25  0.25  0.39  0.87  0.63 
      (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.84)   
Philippines  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.39  0.84 
              (0.63) 
Thailand  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.04 
            (0.04)  (0.06) 
Vietnam  0.001  0.84  1  1  0.63  0.84  0.04 
              (0.02) 
                Brazil  0.25  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.92  1  1 
    (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.63)  (0.39)  (0.39) 
Chile  0.06  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.92  0.57  0.20 
    (0.92)  (0.92)  (0.92)       
Colombia  0.06  0.22  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20 
    (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)    (0.25)  (0.25) 
Mexico  0.00  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Peru  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.39  0.22 
    (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Venezuela  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39 
  (0.63)  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.22)  (0.57)  (0.57) 
                Malawi  0.01  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.63  0.25  0.25 
      (0.63)  (0.63)  (0.92)     
Mozambique  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57 
Uganda  0.84  0.92  0.92  0.92  1  0.57  0.84 
  (0.57)  (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.20)  (0.39) 
Zambia  0.87  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.92 
  (0.02)  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.84) 
Source: Authors‘ calculations using Model Simulation Results 
The cases in which making policy changes endogenous changes the significance of results are highlighted. As before 
any for the changed cases the original baseline numbers are provided in parenthesis. 
 
 
                                                 
 